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December 6, 1968

NOTE FOR MR. KIRK

John:

Dave Williamson and Myron Krueger brought this document, together with their covering memorandum, to us on Friday, December 6. I wish I could be here to discuss it with you; however, perhaps these notes will give you sufficient information upon which to base your decision.

On March 13, 1968, you signed a memo to the NASA Co-Chairman, SACC, giving the views of the DOD members of SACC regarding Goddard Space Flight Center's "Earth Resources Technology Satellite Study." We were rather tough with NASA regarding this study, mainly because the Goddard work had not been coordinated with us in its earliest stages and we did not get to see the work until a printed report was all ready for distribution. I have attached a copy of your comments.

The present situation goes something like this. Recently, Congressman Karth's Subcommittee staff requested a copy of the same Goddard report as a background document for a paper the staff is writing on NASA's earth resources program. Dave Williamson views the situation with grave concern, since he feels that there was no rational explanation for the security classification which now appears on the report. If, for example, he sees that the security classification has been placed on the report at the request of the DOD, he feels that Congressman Karth will handle NASA very severely. Dave also points out that as one reads the report he is unable to find anything SECRET in it. In effect, Dave is saying, "What do I tell Congressman Karth?" Additionally, he is suggesting that we can solve the problem by declassifying the report. I certainly understand Dave's concern. If I were handling the problem in the DOD, I would pass the unclassified copy of this report to Congressman Karth and hope for the best. Dave will not consider this suggestion. Another



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option I have raised is that of sending the report to Karth and gambling that he won't ask any questions about its security. If he did ask a question, I would tell him that the report was under review. A third possibility is to brief Karth on why this report gives us a problem.

Please call on Bill Yost to help you if necessary on this item. He has my itinerary and if you wish to get in touch with me I can be reached at almost any time during my absence. In the meantime, you certainly have my vote on any decision you make.

As you know, Dave Williamson will not start calling you on this item until five minutes after you sit down on Monday morning.

Paulaijo

PAUL E. WORTHMAN Colonel, USAF

Attachments: BYE 12856-68 Cy 2A BYE 17595-68 Cy 1

Comment filed separatily Jaw 15/ Augn

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roved for Release: 2019/05/02 C05108011 Cal Worthman, Dave Williamson has already given the Goddard spit. to harth and Deplained NASA has it under slassification Noview I suggested that if wike dissimination A the report were desired, Dave should proceed to get a Nasa review completed and submit the recommendation to DOD for concurrence. I think we have to let this one be distributed "un classified if NASA recommends this. a In the meantime, Col Williaman suggested we write down a set scheening quidelines for SACK in enough dethil to recap the exceptions to pointing accuracily 12 OAA, synch. alt satellites, met pats etc. Ithink that is a fine idea we can do when you return. 12-12-68

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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

DEC 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John E. Kirk DOD Executive Coordinator Manned Space Flight Policy Committee

The attached study, prepared by the Goddard Space Flight Center in 1967, has been discussed by SACC in the past and the final version was classified SECRET by NASA in recognition of the DOD sensitivity to the discussion of desired ground resolutions.

Congressman Karth has instructed his Subcommittee staff to prepare a committee report on the earth resources survey program prior to the next session of Congress; such a report must obviously be an unclassified document. The Subcommittee staff has specifically requested a copy of the ERTS study, a request we must honor. The Committee staff has been informed that the report is classified pending determination of its security status.

Under the normal security standards which NASA applies (i.e., noncode word), this report would be unclassified and we would be hard put to it to identify for the Subcommittee or its staff the specifics which "affect the National Defense". I am concerned that the Subcommittee may chose to question us aggressively on this subject and that we would be unable to prevent their raising the very issues we all are trying to avoid.


NASA strongly recommends that the DOD review its position on this document in the direction of permitting its early declassification. We would like to have a response early next week.

David

NASA Executive Coordinator

Attachment Cy 12, Series B, ERTSS - October 1967

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SURVEY APPLICATIONS COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Washington, D. C.

March 13, 1968


MEMORANDUM FOR THE NASA CO-CHAIRMAN, SURVEY APPLICATIONS COORDINATING COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Goddard Space Flight Center's Earth Resources Technology Satellite Study

This is in response to your memorandum, "Earth Resources Technology Satellite Study Prepared by Goddard Space Flight Center, BYE 17488-68, dated February 28, 1968. The DOD members of the Survey Applications Coordinating Committee reiterate their finding that the referenced Goddard study is disapproved.

Your memorandum states that "SACC working interpretations... are that such discussions and studies may proceed as long as they do not concern ground resolutions of better than 10 to 15 feet projected five years in the future." We are unaware of such a "working interpretation" or term of reference for SACC. The SACC charter is unequivocal in specifying definitions for SACC's use; nothing regarding 10 to 15 feet appears among them. In SACC, a reconnaissance-like sensor is defined in terms of resolution and not in terms of the type of document in which it appears.

With regard to the suggestion that a selected portion of the July 11, 1966 NSAM 156 Committee Report could be used to advantage to justify the Goddard study, the general effect of broadening our terms of reference would be to further constrain the study. For example, the text of Recommendation 4 is balanced by the definition cited below it, placing a 0.1 milliradian limit on study and design as well as development. Secondly, to exploit the NSAM 156 Committee Report further would call for SACC to assess each NASA project or study in terms of Point 5, considering "carefully the relative merits and costs of aerial and other



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possible alternatives...," the "practical political interests," and the "cost effectiveness." It should be clear that this is not a good time to expand the criteria against which NASA's projects are evaluated by SACC.

The DOD members of SACC cannot accept the following points as arguments for approval:

1. That this satellite deserves exemption because it flies higher than most.

2. That this satellite should be approved because its Videcon is unclassified and industrially sponsored.

3. That the camera performance violates SACC terms of reference only slightly.

Finally, the proposal to distribute this document, in spite of the SACC disapproval, "as an unclassified document for dissemination and use by NASA, NASA contractors, and User agencies" is of great concern to the DOD members. The recipients would certainly interpret the document as a serious interest on the part of NASA. Their response would result in another surge of enthusiasm for entry into forbidden areas, augmenting the customer bow-wave which is causing NASA so many problems at the present time.

We wish again to invite you to present studies like this for SACC review while they are in the planning stage, rather than after they are printed. Good progress is being made in this direction; continued close adherence to the SACC charter's terms of submission will do much to anticipate and forestall similar problems.

We trust that the NASA members will find our argument persuasive. If they still find themselves in disagreement with us, the issue should be forwarded to the Manned Space Flight Policy Committee for review and adjudication.

John Kirk

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